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Abstract
Many applications of machine learning and optimization operate on data streams. While these
datasets are fundamental to fuel decision-making algorithms, often they contain sensitive informa-
tion about individuals, and their usage poses significant privacy risks. Motivated by an application
in energy systems, this paper presents OPTSTREAM, a novel algorithm for releasing differentially
private data streams under the w-event model of privacy. OPTSTREAM is a 4-step procedure con-
sisting of sampling, perturbation, reconstruction, and post-processing modules. First, the sampling
module selects a small set of points to access in each period of interest. Then, the perturbation mod-
ule adds noise to the sampled data points to guarantee privacy. Next, the reconstruction module re-
assembles non-sampled data points from the perturbed sample points. Finally, the post-processing
module uses convex optimization over the private output of the previous modules, as well as the
private answers of additional queries on the data stream, to improve accuracy by redistributing the
added noise. OPTSTREAM is evaluated on a test case involving the release of a real data stream
from the largest European transmission operator. Experimental results show that OPTSTREAM may
not only improve the accuracy of state-of-the-art methods by at least one order of magnitude but
also supports accurate load forecasting on the private data.
1. Introduction
Differential privacy (Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, & Smith, 2006) has emerged as a robust framework
to release datasets while limiting the disclosure of participating individuals. Informally, it ensures
that what can be learned about an individual in a differential private dataset is, with high probability,
limited to what could have been learned about the individual in the same dataset but without her data.
Many applications of machine learning and optimization, in areas such as healthcare, traffic
management, and social networks, operate over streams of data. The use of differential privacy
for the private release of time series has attracted increased attention in recent years (e.g., (Dwork,
Naor, Pitassi, & Rothblum, 2010; Dwork, 2010; Fanti, Pihur, & Erlingsson, 2016; Ding, Kulkarni,
& Yekhanin, 2017; Chen, Machanavajjhala, Hay, & Miklau, 2017)) where aggregated statistics are
continuously reported. Two common approaches for time series data release are the event-level and
user-level privacy models (Dwork et al., 2010). The former focuses on protecting a single event,
while the latter aims at protecting all the events associated with a single user, i.e., it focuses on
protecting the presence of an individual in the dataset. Additionally, Kellaris, Papadopoulos, Xiao,
and Papadias (2014) proposed the notion of w-event privacy to achieve a balance between event-
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level and user-level privacy, trading off utility and privacy to protect event sequences within a time
window of w time steps.
This paper was motivated by a desire to release private streams of energy demands, also called
loads, in transmission systems. The goal is that of protecting changes in consumer loads up to some
desired amount within critical time intervals. Although customer identities are typically considered
public information (e.g., each facility is served by some energy provider), their loads can be highly
sensitive as they may reveal the economic activities of grid customers. For example, changes in load
consumption may indirectly reveal production levels and strategic investments and other similar
information. Moreover, these time series are often input to complex analytic tasks, e.g., demand
forecasting algorithms (Nogales, Contreras, Conejo, & Espı´nola, 2002) and optimal power flows
(Ochoa & Harrison, 2011). As a result, the accuracy of the private datasets is critical and, as shown
later in the paper, existing algorithms for time series fall short in this respect for this application.
The main contribution of this paper is a new privacy mechanism that remedies these limitations
and is sufficiently precise for use in forecasting and optimization applications. The new algorithm,
called OPTSTREAM, is presented under the framework of w-event privacy and is a 4-step procedure
consisting of sampling, perturbation, reconstruction, and post-processing modules. The sampling
module selects a small set of points for private measurement in each period of interest, the pertur-
bation module introduces noise to the sampled data points to guarantee privacy, the reconstruction
module reconstructs the non-sampled data points from the perturbed sampled points, and the post-
processing module uses convex optimization over the private output of the previous modules, as well
as the private answers of additional queries on the data stream, to redistribute the noise to ensure
consistency of salient features of the data. OPTSTREAM is also generalized to answer queries over
hierarchical streams, allowing data curators to monitor simultaneously streams produced by energy
profile data at different levels of aggregation. It is important to emphasize that, although OPT-
STREAM was motivated by an energy application, it is potentially useful for many other domains,
since its design is independent of the underlying problem.
OPTSTREAM is evaluated on real datasets from Re´seau de Transport d’E´lectricite´, the French
transmission operator and the largest in Europe. The dataset contains the energy consumption for
one year at a granularity of 30 minutes. OPTSTREAM is also compared with state-of-the-art algo-
rithms adapted to w-event privacy. Experimental results show that OPTSTREAM improves the ac-
curacy of state-of-the-art algorithms by at least one order of magnitude for this application domain.
The effectiveness of the proposed algorithm is measured, not only in terms of the error between the
reported private streams and the original stream but also in the accuracy of a load forecasting algo-
rithm based on the private data. Finally, the paper shows that the sampling and optimization-based
post-processing steps are critical in achieving the desired performance and that the improvements
are also observed when releasing hierarchical streams of data.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the stream model, summarizes
the privacy goals of this work, and reviews the notion of differential privacy over streams. Section
3 describes OPTSTREAM and the design choices of its components. Section 4 analyzes the accu-
racy of the proposed framework and shows how it reduces the error introduced to preserve privacy
when compared to a standard solution. Section 5 extends OPTSTREAM to the α-indistinguishability
privacy model, allowing privacy protection of arbitrary quantities and which is critical for the mo-
tivating application. Additionally, OPTSTREAM is extended to handle hierarchical stream data.
Section 6 performs a comprehensive experimental analysis of real data streams from energy load
profiles. Section 7 discusses key aspects of the privacy model adopted to privately releasing streams
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of data, as well as differences with the event-based model for data streams. Section 8 discusses the
related work and, finally, Section 9 concludes the work.
2. Preliminaries
This section first reviews basic concepts in differential privacy. It then presents the w-event privacy
model used to protect privacy in data streams and its definition of differential privacy.
2.1 Differential Privacy
This section reviews the standard definition of differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006). Differential
privacy focuses on protecting the privacy of an individual user participating to a dataset. Such notion
relies on the definition of a adjacency relation ∼ between datasets. Two datasets X,X ′ are called
neighbors if their content differs in at most one tuple: X ∼ X ′ ⇔ ‖X −X ′‖ ≤ 1.
Definition1 (Differential Privacy) Let A be a randomized algorithm that takes as input a dataset
and outputs an element from a set of possible responses. A achieves -differential privacy if, for all
sets O ⊆ O and all neighboring datasets X,X ′ ∈ D:
Pr[A(X) ∈ O]
Pr[A(X ′) ∈ O] ≤ exp(). (1)
The level of privacy is controlled by the parameter  ≥ 0, called the privacy budget, with values
close to 0 denoting strong privacy. The adjacency relation ∼ captures the participation of an in-
dividual into the dataset. While differential privacy algorithms commonly adopts the 1-Hamming
distance as adjacency relation between datasets, the latter can be generalized to be any symmetric
binary relation ∼∈ D2. In particular, the relation ∼ captures the aspects of the private data D that
are considered sensitive and has been generalized to protect locations of individuals (Fawaz & Shin,
2014) and quantities in general (Chatzikokolakis, Andre´s, Bordenabe, & Palamidessi, 2013). When
a single entry is associated with a user in the database, an algorithm satisfying Equation (1) pre-
vents an attacker with access to the algorithm’s output from learning anything substantial about any
individual.
2.1.1 PROPERTIES OF DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
Differential privacy enjoys several important properties, including composability and immunity to
post-processing.
Composability Composability ensures that a combination of differentially private algorithms pre-
serve differential privacy (Dwork & Roth, 2013).
Theorem1 (Sequential Composition) The composition A(D) = (A1(D), . . . ,Ak(D)) of a col-
lection {Ai}ki=1 of i-differentially private algorithms satisfies (
∑k
i=1 i)-differentially privacy.
Theorem2 (Parallel Composition) Let D1 and D2 be disjoint subsets of D and A be an -
differentially private algorithm. Then computingA(D∩D1) andA(D∩D2) satisfies -differential
privacy.
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Post-processing Immunity Post-processing immunity ensures that privacy guarantees are pre-
served by arbitrary post-processing steps (Dwork & Roth, 2013).
Theorem3 (Post-Processing Immunity) Let A be an -differentially private algorithm and g be
an arbitrary mapping from the set of possible output sequences O to an arbitrary set. Then, g ◦ A
is -differentially private.
We now introduce two useful differentially private algorithms.
2.1.2 THE LAPLACE MECHANISM
A numeric queryQ, mapping a dataset toRd, can be made differentially private by injecting random
noise to its output. The amount of noise to inject depends on the sensitivity of the query, denoted by
∆Q and defined as,
∆Q = max
D∼D′
∥∥Q(D)−Q(D′)∥∥
1
.
In other words, the sensitivity of a query is the maximum L1-distance between the query outputs
from any two neighboring dataset D and D′. For instance, ∆Q = 1 for a query Q that counts the
number of users in a dataset.
The Laplace distribution with 0 mean and scale b, denoted by Lap(b), has a probability density
function Lap(x|b) = 12be−
|x|
b . It can be used to obtain an -differentially private algorithm to answer
numeric queries (Dwork et al., 2006). In the following, we use Lap(λ)d to denote the i.i.d. Laplace
distribution over d dimensions with parameter λ.
Theorem4 (Laplace MechanismMLap) Let Q be a numeric query that maps datasets to Rd. The
Laplace mechanism that outputs Q(D) + z, where z ∈ R is drawn from the Laplace distribution
Lap
(
∆Q

)d
, achieves -differential privacy.
2.1.3 SPARSE VECTOR TECHNIQUE
The Sparse Vector Technique (SVT) is an important tool of differential privacy (Dwork & Roth,
2013; Hardt & Rothblum, 2010) that allows to answer a sequence of queries without incurring
a high privacy cost. The SVT mechanism is given a sequence of queries Q = q1, q2, . . . and a
sequence of real valued thresholds Θ = θ1, θ2, . . . and outputs a vector indicating whether each
query answer qi is above or below the corresponding threshold θi. In other words, the output is a
vector {>,⊥}` where ` is the number of queries answered and> (resp. ⊥) indicates that the answer
to a noisy query is (resp. is not) above a noisy threshold.
The SVT mechanism is summarized in Algorithm 1. It takes as input a dataset D, a sequence
of queries Q = q1, q2, . . ., each with sensitivity no more than ∆Q, a sequence of thresholds Θ =
θ1, θ2, . . ., and a constant k, denoting the maximum number of queries to be answered with value
>. Its output consists of a sequence of answers a1, a2, . . . with each ai ∈ {>,⊥}. For each query,
SVT perturbs the corresponding threshold and checks if the perturbed individual query answer is
above the noisy threshold.
Theorem5 (SVT) The SVT mechanism achieves -differential privacy (Hardt & Rothblum, 2010).
The SVT mechanism is useful especially in situations when one expects that most answers fall
below the threshold, since the noise depends on k. The SVT mechanism will be used in this paper
to find good sampled points in a stream.
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Algorithm 1: SVT - Sparse Vector Technique
input : D: the dataset
Q = q1, q2, . . .: a sequence of queries
Θ = θ1, θ2, . . .: a sequence of thresholds
k: the maximum number of queries to be answered positively
: the privacy budget
1 ρ = Lap(2∆Q/);
2 count = 0;
3 foreach query qi ∈ Q do
4 νi = Lap(4k∆Q/);
5 if qi(D) + νi ≥ θi + ρ then
6 output ai = >;
7 count = count + 1;
8 Break if count ≥ k;
9 else
10 output ai = ⊥;
2.2 The w-Event Privacy Model for Data Streams
This section presents the privacy model for streams adopted in this paper. A data stream D is
an infinite sequence of elements in the data universe U = I × T , where I denotes the set of
user identifiers and T is a possibly unbounded set of time steps. In other words, each tuple (i, t)
describes an event reported by user i that occurred at time t. Time is represented through discrete
steps T = {1, 2, . . .} and user events are recorded periodically (e.g., every 30 minutes). In a data
stream D, tuples are ordered by arrival time. If tuple (i, t) arrives after tuple (i′, t′), then t ≥ t′.
Additionally, In the following, D[t] denotes a stream prefix, i.e., the sequence D1, . . . , Dt of all
tuples observed on or before time t. Additionally, D denotes the set of all datasets describing
collections of tuples in U .
Example1 Consider a data stream system that collects location data from WiFi access points (APs)
in a collection of buildings. Users correspond to MAC addresses of individual devices that connect
to an AP. An item (i, t) in the data stream represents that the fact that user i has made at least one
connection to an access point at time step t. In the following table, user 02:18:98:09:1a:a4
reports a connection at times t = 1 and t = 2. The example represents a data stream prefix D[3].
D1 D2 D3 . . .
02:18:98:09:1a:a4 02:18:98:09:1a:a4 05:12:11:0a:30:03
05:12:11:0a:30:03 05:12:11:0a:30:03 11:28:18:a9:1b:a3
11:28:18:a9:1b:a3 11:28:18:a9:1b:a3 07:22:1a:12:31:33
07:22:1a:12:31:33 01:11:e2:14:43:b2
01:11:e2:14:43:b2
The data curator receives information from an unbounded data stream D in discrete time steps. At
time t, the curator collects a dataset Dt of tuples (i, t) where every row corresponds to a unique
user. The curator reports the result of a count query Q : D → R that reports how many users are in
the dataset at time t, i.e., Q(Dt) = |{i : (i, t) ∈ Dt}|.
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Example2 Consider the data stream prefix of Example 1. The associated result of the count queries
executed onto each dataset of the data stream is given in the following table.
Q(D1) Q(D2) Q(D3) . . .
3 5 4
In our target application, the data curator is interested in publishing every element Q(Dt) for a
recurring period of w time steps. A w-period is a set of w contiguous time steps t−w+1,. . . ,t
(w≥ 1). Thus, the answers to each query Q(Dt) are generated in real time for windows of w time
steps. As a result, this paper adopts the w-event privacy framework by Kellaris et al. (2014).
2.3 Differential Privacy on Streams
The w-event privacy framework (Kellaris et al., 2014) extends the definition of differential privacy
to protect data streams and has become a standard privacy notion for data streams (see, for instance,
(Rastogi & Nath, 2010; Dwork & Roth, 2013; Andre´s, Bordenabe, Chatzikokolakis, & Palamidessi,
2013; Bolot, Fawaz, Muthukrishnan, Nikolov, & Taft, 2013; Chan, Shi, & Song, 2011)). The frame-
work operates on stream prefixes and two data streams prefixes D[t] and D′[t] are w-neighbors,
denoted by D[t] ∼w D′[t], if
i. for each Di, D′i with i ∈ [t], Di ∼ D′i, and
ii. for each Di, D′i, Dj , D
′
j such that i < j ∈ [t] and Di 6= D′i, Dj 6= D′j , j − i+ 1 ≤ w holds.
In other words, two stream prefixes are w-neighbors if their elements are pairwise neighbors and all
the differing elements are within a time window of up to w time steps. As a result, when ensuring
the privacy guarantees, the w-event framework does not consider data streams where the differences
are beyond a time window of size w: It only needs to consider windows of w elements.
Definition2 (w-privacy) Let A be a randomized algorithm that takes as input a stream prefix D[t]
of arbitrary size and outputs an element from a set of possible output sequences O. Algorithm A
satisfies w-event -differential privacy (w-privacy for short) if, for all t, all sets O ⊆ O, and all
w-neighboring stream prefixes D[t] and D′[t]:
Pr[A(D[t]) ∈ O]
Pr[A(D′[t]) ∈ O] ≤ exp(). (2)
An algorithm satisfying w-privacy protects the sensitive information that could be disclosed from a
sequence of finite length w. When w= 1, w-privacy reduces to event-level privacy (Dwork et al.,
2010) that protects the disclosure of events in a single time step.
All the properties of differential privacy discussed above carry over to w-privacy. The Laplace
mechanism which adds Laplace noise to each element of the stream with parameterw∆Q/ achieves
w-privacy (Kellaris et al., 2014).
The algorithms studied in this paper satisfy Definition 2. When clear from the context, the paper
uses -differential privacy to denote w-event privacy. A list of common symbols is summarized in
Table 1.
6
OPTSTREAM: RELEASING TIME SERIES PRIVATELY
Symbol Definition Symbol Definition
U Data universe ∼w neighboring relation
D Data stream xt Result of query Q(Dt)
Dt Dataset at time t xˆt Private estimate of xt
D[t] Stream prefixes x Data stream
Q A query on a dataset xˆ Private data stream
∆Q Sensitivity of query Q rtu User’s u value at time t
Table 1: Commonly used symbols and notations.
3. OptStream For Stream Release
This section describes OPTSTREAM, a novel algorithm for private data stream release. OPT-
STREAM consists of four steps: (1) data sampling, (2) perturbation, (3) reconstruction of the non-
sampled data points, and (4) optimization-based post-processing. The algorithm takes as input the
data stream, denoted by DI = DI1, D
I
2, . . ., the period size w whose privacy is to be protected, the
privacy budget , and some hyper-parameters used by its procedures, which will be described later.
Its output is a data stream summary xˆ = (xˆ1, xˆ2, . . .) where each xˆt represents a private version of
the aggregated real data in DIt . Here, an aggregation operation is one that transforms the dataset
into a numerical representation (e.g., a count). The four steps can be summarized as follows:
1. SAMPLE: selects a small set of points for each w-period. Its goal is to perform a dimen-
sionality reduction over the data stream whose sample points can be used to generate private
answers to each query with low error.
2. PERTURB: adds noise to the sampled data points to guarantee privacy.
3. RECONSTRUCT: reconstructs the non-sampling data points from the perturbed sampled
points. Its goal is to map the dimension-reduced data stream back to the original space,
generating thus w data points.
4. POST-PROCESS: uses the private output of the above modules, as well as private answers to
additional queries on the data stream to ensure consistency of salient features of the data.
OPTSTREAM balances two types of errors: a perturbation error, introduced by the application of
additive noise at the sampling points, and a reconstruction error, introduced by the reconstruction
procedure at the non-sampled points. The higher the number of samples in a w-period, the more
perturbation error is introduced while the reconstruction error may be reduced, and vice-versa. Sec-
tion 4 describes the error generated by these two components and analyzes the number of samples
that minimizes the error.
OPTSTREAM processes the data stream in consecutive and disjoint w-periods. To simplify
notation, throughout this section, the paper uses D = D1, . . . , Dw and x = x1, . . . , xw to denote,
respectively, the current w-period being processed, and its univariate discrete series representation,
where each xi denotes the result of an aggregation function aggr(Di) that transforms the dataset into
a numerical representation. Similarly, we use D′ and x′ to denote their neighboring counterparts.
Additionally, given a set of time steps indexes S, x[S] denotes the collection of points {xi|i ∈ S}.
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Algorithm 2: OPTSTREAM data stream release
input : DI = (DI1, DI2, . . .): the data stream
w: the size of the period
: the privacy budget
k, θ,F : hyperparameters
output: xˆ = (xˆ1, xˆ2, . . .): a private data stream summary
Let t be the current time step
1 if t (mod w) ≡ 0 then
2 D← DIt−w+1, . . . DIt
3 RELEASE (D, k, w, , θ,F )
Function RELEASE(D, w, , k, θ,F):
4 x← aggr (D1), . . . aggr (Dw)
5 s, p, o ← split budget 
6 S = SAMPLE (x, s, k, θ)
7 x˜S = PERTURB (x[S], p)
8 x˜ = RECONSTRUCT (x˜S , w)
9 xˆ = POSTPROCESS (x˜, o, {QF(D)}F∈F )
10 release xˆ
For simplicity, we will assume that the sensitivity of the aggregation operations is one. The results
directly generalize to arbitrary sensitivities.
OPTSTREAM is depicted in Algorithm 2. When a new w-period is observed (line 1), the algo-
rithm extracts the relevant portion of the stream (line 2) and calls function RELEASE, which releases
a private version of the data stream in the current w-period (line 3).
In addition to the portion D of the data stream to release, the size of the w-period w, and the
privacy budget , function RELEASE takes, as inputs, three hyperparamers: k, θ, andF . Parameters
k and θ are used by procedure SAMPLE and represent the maximum number of data points to extract
in the w-period and a threshold value respectively. Parameter F is a set of features queries used
by procedure POSTPROCESS; these queries and their uses will be covered in detail later. The four
steps of Function RELEASE operate on a discrete series representation x of the data stream (line
4). The privacy budget to be used in each step is computed in line (5). Procedure SAMPLE takes as
input the sequence of values x, the maximum number k of data points to sample, and the portion
s ≥ 0 of the privacy budget  used in the sampling process1 (line 6). It outputs the set S of indexes
associated with the values of x whose privacy must be protected. Procedure PERTURB takes, as
input, the vector x[S] of sampled data points from x and outputs a noisy version x˜S of x, using a
portion p > 0 of the overall privacy budget (line 7). Procedure RECONSTRUCT takes, as inputs,
the vector x˜S from the perturbation step and the size w of the period and outputs a vector x˜ of size
w whose values are private estimates of the data stream in the w-period (line 8). Next, procedure
POSTPROCESS takes as input the vector of points x˜, additional feature queries QF(D) for each
feature F in the set of data features F (which are defined in detail in Section 3.4), and uses a
1. s can be 0 if the sampling processes does not access the real data to make a decision on which points to sample.
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portion o > 0 of the overall privacy budget  to compute a final estimate xˆ of x (line 9). Finally,
the private estimates xˆ are released (line 10).
Lemma1 Let s + p + o = . When the SAMPLE, PERTURB, and POST-PROCESS procedures
satisfy s-, p-, and o-differential privacy, respectively, Algorithm 2 satisfies -differential privacy.
Any sampling, perturbation, and reconstruction algorithms can be used within Algorithm 2, pro-
vided that they achieve the intended purpose and satisfy the required privacy guarantees. The next
section describes two variants of the sampling and reconstruction algorithms that may reduce the
error (Section 4) and are shown to perform well experimentally (Section 6). The perturbation pro-
cedure is a standard application of the Laplace mechanism (Theorem 4) on the set of sampled data
points and parallel composition (Theorem 2). The post-processing step is described in Section 3.4.
3.1 The Sampling Procedures
The goal of the sampling procedure is to select k points of the given w-period that summarize the
entire data stream period well. This section considers two strategies.
Equally-Spaced Sampling A first strategy is to sample k equally-spaced data points in the w-
period. Since this approach does not inspect the values of the data stream to make its decisions, it
does not consume any privacy budget, i.e., s = 0.
L1-Based Sampling The second strategy also selects k out of w points but tries to minimize the
error between the original data points and the points generated by a linear interpolation of the k
selected points. Let ξ[i,j] be a function capturing the line segment between two points xi and xj ,
i.e.,
ξ[i,j](t) = (t− i)xj − xi
j − i + xi
for t ∈ [i, j]. Consider an ordered sequence S = (ι1, . . . , ιk) of k indexes in [w] and define ξS as a
piecewise linear function whose pieces are line segments between every two adjacent points in S,
ξS(t) =

ξ[ι1,ι2](t) if t ∈ [ι1, ι2]
ξ[ι2,ι3](t) if t ∈ [ι2, ι3]
...
ξ[ιk−1,ιk](t) if t ∈ [ιk−1, ιk].
Define the L[a,b]1 -scoring function for 1 ≤ a < b ≤ w as,
L
[a,b]
1 (D) =
b∑
i=a
∣∣∣ξ[a,b](i)− xi∣∣∣ . (3)
The L1-based sampling procedure aims at selecting a sequence S of k indexes ι1 < ι2 < . . . < ιk
in a w-period that minimizes the LS1 -scoring function defined as,
min
S
LS1 (D) = minι1<ι2<...<ιk
k−1∑
j=1
L
[ιj ,ιj+1]
1 (D). (4)
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x2<latexit sha1_ba se64="4WsehhMwczBELPbhlK8GhP349a s=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aO XxSL0VJIi6LHgxWMF0xbaUDbbSbt0swm 7G7GE/gYvHhTx6g/y5r9x2+agrQ8GHu/ NMDMvTAXXxnW/nY3Nre2d3dJeef/g8O i4cnLa1kmmGPosEYnqhlSj4BJ9w43Abq qQxqHATji5nfudR1SaJ/LBTFMMYjqSP OKMGiv5+dOgMRtUqm7dXYCsE68gVSjQG lS++sOEZTFKwwTVuue5qQlyqgxnAmflf qYxpWxCR9izVNIYdZAvjp2RS6sMSZQo W9KQhfp7Iqex1tM4tJ0xNWO96s3F/7xe ZqKbIOcyzQxKtlwUZYKYhMw/J0OukBk xtYQyxe2thI2poszYfMo2BG/15XXSbtQ 9t+7dX1WbtSKOEpzDBdTAg2towh20wA cGHJ7hFd4c6bw4787HsnXDKWbO4A+czx /KGI6T</latexit><latexit sha1_ba se64="4WsehhMwczBELPbhlK8GhP349a s=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aO XxSL0VJIi6LHgxWMF0xbaUDbbSbt0swm 7G7GE/gYvHhTx6g/y5r9x2+agrQ8GHu/ NMDMvTAXXxnW/nY3Nre2d3dJeef/g8O i4cnLa1kmmGPosEYnqhlSj4BJ9w43Abq qQxqHATji5nfudR1SaJ/LBTFMMYjqSP OKMGiv5+dOgMRtUqm7dXYCsE68gVSjQG lS++sOEZTFKwwTVuue5qQlyqgxnAmflf qYxpWxCR9izVNIYdZAvjp2RS6sMSZQo W9KQhfp7Iqex1tM4tJ0xNWO96s3F/7xe ZqKbIOcyzQxKtlwUZYKYhMw/J0OukBk xtYQyxe2thI2poszYfMo2BG/15XXSbtQ 9t+7dX1WbtSKOEpzDBdTAg2towh20wA cGHJ7hFd4c6bw4787HsnXDKWbO4A+czx /KGI6T</latexit><latexit sha1_ba se64="4WsehhMwczBELPbhlK8GhP349a s=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aO XxSL0VJIi6LHgxWMF0xbaUDbbSbt0swm 7G7GE/gYvHhTx6g/y5r9x2+agrQ8GHu/ NMDMvTAXXxnW/nY3Nre2d3dJeef/g8O i4cnLa1kmmGPosEYnqhlSj4BJ9w43Abq qQxqHATji5nfudR1SaJ/LBTFMMYjqSP OKMGiv5+dOgMRtUqm7dXYCsE68gVSjQG lS++sOEZTFKwwTVuue5qQlyqgxnAmflf qYxpWxCR9izVNIYdZAvjp2RS6sMSZQo W9KQhfp7Iqex1tM4tJ0xNWO96s3F/7xe ZqKbIOcyzQxKtlwUZYKYhMw/J0OukBk xtYQyxe2thI2poszYfMo2BG/15XXSbtQ 9t+7dX1WbtSKOEpzDBdTAg2towh20wA cGHJ7hFd4c6bw4787HsnXDKWbO4A+czx /KGI6T</latexit><latexit sha1_ba se64="4WsehhMwczBELPbhlK8GhP349a s=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aO XxSL0VJIi6LHgxWMF0xbaUDbbSbt0swm 7G7GE/gYvHhTx6g/y5r9x2+agrQ8GHu/ NMDMvTAXXxnW/nY3Nre2d3dJeef/g8O i4cnLa1kmmGPosEYnqhlSj4BJ9w43Abq qQxqHATji5nfudR1SaJ/LBTFMMYjqSP OKMGiv5+dOgMRtUqm7dXYCsE68gVSjQG lS++sOEZTFKwwTVuue5qQlyqgxnAmflf qYxpWxCR9izVNIYdZAvjp2RS6sMSZQo W9KQhfp7Iqex1tM4tJ0xNWO96s3F/7xe ZqKbIOcyzQxKtlwUZYKYhMw/J0OukBk xtYQyxe2thI2poszYfMo2BG/15XXSbtQ 9t+7dX1WbtSKOEpzDBdTAg2towh20wA cGHJ7hFd4c6bw4787HsnXDKWbO4A+czx /KGI6T</latexit>
x3
<latexit sha1_base64="rwjK+CmMcy HskvXEj90BNBPcWes=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aOXxSL0VBIV9Fjw4rG CaQttKJvtpl262YTdiVhCf4MXD4p49Qd589+4bXPQ1gcDj/dmmJkXplIYdN1vZ2 19Y3Nru7RT3t3bPzisHB23TJJpxn2WyER3Qmq4FIr7KFDyTqo5jUPJ2+H4dua3H7 k2IlEPOEl5ENOhEpFgFK3k50/9y2m/UnXr7hxklXgFqUKBZr/y1RskLIu5QiapM V3PTTHIqUbBJJ+We5nhKWVjOuRdSxWNuQny+bFTcm6VAYkSbUshmau/J3IaGzOJ Q9sZUxyZZW8m/ud1M4xuglyoNEOu2GJRlEmCCZl9TgZCc4ZyYgllWthbCRtRTRn afMo2BG/55VXSuqh7bt27v6o2akUcJTiFM6iBB9fQgDtogg8MBDzDK7w5ynlx3p 2PReuaU8ycwB84nz/LnY6U</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="rwjK+CmMcy HskvXEj90BNBPcWes=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aOXxSL0VBIV9Fjw4rG CaQttKJvtpl262YTdiVhCf4MXD4p49Qd589+4bXPQ1gcDj/dmmJkXplIYdN1vZ2 19Y3Nru7RT3t3bPzisHB23TJJpxn2WyER3Qmq4FIr7KFDyTqo5jUPJ2+H4dua3H7 k2IlEPOEl5ENOhEpFgFK3k50/9y2m/UnXr7hxklXgFqUKBZr/y1RskLIu5QiapM V3PTTHIqUbBJJ+We5nhKWVjOuRdSxWNuQny+bFTcm6VAYkSbUshmau/J3IaGzOJ Q9sZUxyZZW8m/ud1M4xuglyoNEOu2GJRlEmCCZl9TgZCc4ZyYgllWthbCRtRTRn afMo2BG/55VXSuqh7bt27v6o2akUcJTiFM6iBB9fQgDtogg8MBDzDK7w5ynlx3p 2PReuaU8ycwB84nz/LnY6U</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="rwjK+CmMcy HskvXEj90BNBPcWes=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aOXxSL0VBIV9Fjw4rG CaQttKJvtpl262YTdiVhCf4MXD4p49Qd589+4bXPQ1gcDj/dmmJkXplIYdN1vZ2 19Y3Nru7RT3t3bPzisHB23TJJpxn2WyER3Qmq4FIr7KFDyTqo5jUPJ2+H4dua3H7 k2IlEPOEl5ENOhEpFgFK3k50/9y2m/UnXr7hxklXgFqUKBZr/y1RskLIu5QiapM V3PTTHIqUbBJJ+We5nhKWVjOuRdSxWNuQny+bFTcm6VAYkSbUshmau/J3IaGzOJ Q9sZUxyZZW8m/ud1M4xuglyoNEOu2GJRlEmCCZl9TgZCc4ZyYgllWthbCRtRTRn afMo2BG/55VXSuqh7bt27v6o2akUcJTiFM6iBB9fQgDtogg8MBDzDK7w5ynlx3p 2PReuaU8ycwB84nz/LnY6U</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="rwjK+CmMcy HskvXEj90BNBPcWes=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aOXxSL0VBIV9Fjw4rG CaQttKJvtpl262YTdiVhCf4MXD4p49Qd589+4bXPQ1gcDj/dmmJkXplIYdN1vZ2 19Y3Nru7RT3t3bPzisHB23TJJpxn2WyER3Qmq4FIr7KFDyTqo5jUPJ2+H4dua3H7 k2IlEPOEl5ENOhEpFgFK3k50/9y2m/UnXr7hxklXgFqUKBZr/y1RskLIu5QiapM V3PTTHIqUbBJJ+We5nhKWVjOuRdSxWNuQny+bFTcm6VAYkSbUshmau/J3IaGzOJ Q9sZUxyZZW8m/ud1M4xuglyoNEOu2GJRlEmCCZl9TgZCc4ZyYgllWthbCRtRTRn afMo2BG/55VXSuqh7bt27v6o2akUcJTiFM6iBB9fQgDtogg8MBDzDK7w5ynlx3p 2PReuaU8ycwB84nz/LnY6U</latexit>
x6
<latexit sha1_base64="we4uAmk0Fq XS4T5/gXBFoZoPRHk=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aOXxSL0VBIR9Vjw4rG CaQttKJvtpl262YTdiVhCf4MXD4p49Qd589+4bXPQ1gcDj/dmmJkXplIYdN1vZ2 19Y3Nru7RT3t3bPzisHB23TJJpxn2WyER3Qmq4FIr7KFDyTqo5jUPJ2+H4dua3H7 k2IlEPOEl5ENOhEpFgFK3k50/9q2m/UnXr7hxklXgFqUKBZr/y1RskLIu5QiapM V3PTTHIqUbBJJ+We5nhKWVjOuRdSxWNuQny+bFTcm6VAYkSbUshmau/J3IaGzOJ Q9sZUxyZZW8m/ud1M4xuglyoNEOu2GJRlEmCCZl9TgZCc4ZyYgllWthbCRtRTRn afMo2BG/55VXSuqh7bt27v6w2akUcJTiFM6iBB9fQgDtogg8MBDzDK7w5ynlx3p 2PReuaU8ycwB84nz/QLI6X</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="we4uAmk0Fq XS4T5/gXBFoZoPRHk=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aOXxSL0VBIR9Vjw4rG CaQttKJvtpl262YTdiVhCf4MXD4p49Qd589+4bXPQ1gcDj/dmmJkXplIYdN1vZ2 19Y3Nru7RT3t3bPzisHB23TJJpxn2WyER3Qmq4FIr7KFDyTqo5jUPJ2+H4dua3H7 k2IlEPOEl5ENOhEpFgFK3k50/9q2m/UnXr7hxklXgFqUKBZr/y1RskLIu5QiapM V3PTTHIqUbBJJ+We5nhKWVjOuRdSxWNuQny+bFTcm6VAYkSbUshmau/J3IaGzOJ Q9sZUxyZZW8m/ud1M4xuglyoNEOu2GJRlEmCCZl9TgZCc4ZyYgllWthbCRtRTRn afMo2BG/55VXSuqh7bt27v6w2akUcJTiFM6iBB9fQgDtogg8MBDzDK7w5ynlx3p 2PReuaU8ycwB84nz/QLI6X</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="we4uAmk0Fq XS4T5/gXBFoZoPRHk=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aOXxSL0VBIR9Vjw4rG CaQttKJvtpl262YTdiVhCf4MXD4p49Qd589+4bXPQ1gcDj/dmmJkXplIYdN1vZ2 19Y3Nru7RT3t3bPzisHB23TJJpxn2WyER3Qmq4FIr7KFDyTqo5jUPJ2+H4dua3H7 k2IlEPOEl5ENOhEpFgFK3k50/9q2m/UnXr7hxklXgFqUKBZr/y1RskLIu5QiapM V3PTTHIqUbBJJ+We5nhKWVjOuRdSxWNuQny+bFTcm6VAYkSbUshmau/J3IaGzOJ Q9sZUxyZZW8m/ud1M4xuglyoNEOu2GJRlEmCCZl9TgZCc4ZyYgllWthbCRtRTRn afMo2BG/55VXSuqh7bt27v6w2akUcJTiFM6iBB9fQgDtogg8MBDzDK7w5ynlx3p 2PReuaU8ycwB84nz/QLI6X</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="we4uAmk0Fq XS4T5/gXBFoZoPRHk=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aOXxSL0VBIR9Vjw4rG CaQttKJvtpl262YTdiVhCf4MXD4p49Qd589+4bXPQ1gcDj/dmmJkXplIYdN1vZ2 19Y3Nru7RT3t3bPzisHB23TJJpxn2WyER3Qmq4FIr7KFDyTqo5jUPJ2+H4dua3H7 k2IlEPOEl5ENOhEpFgFK3k50/9q2m/UnXr7hxklXgFqUKBZr/y1RskLIu5QiapM V3PTTHIqUbBJJ+We5nhKWVjOuRdSxWNuQny+bFTcm6VAYkSbUshmau/J3IaGzOJ Q9sZUxyZZW8m/ud1M4xuglyoNEOu2GJRlEmCCZl9TgZCc4ZyYgllWthbCRtRTRn afMo2BG/55VXSuqh7bt27v6w2akUcJTiFM6iBB9fQgDtogg8MBDzDK7w5ynlx3p 2PReuaU8ycwB84nz/QLI6X</latexit>
x1<latexit sha1_ba se64="gGptupImd/7iYtmAQiLHsVgH1a k=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh6 9LBahp5KIoMeCF48VTFtoQ9lsN+3SzSb sTsQS+hu8eFDEqz/Im//GbZuDtj4YeLw 3w8y8MJXCoOt+O6WNza3tnfJuZW//4P CoenzSNkmmGfdZIhPdDanhUijuo0DJu6 nmNA4l74ST27nfeeTaiEQ94DTlQUxHS kSCUbSSnz8NvNmgWnMb7gJknXgFqUGB1 qD61R8mLIu5QiapMT3PTTHIqUbBJJ9V+ pnhKWUTOuI9SxWNuQnyxbEzcmGVIYkS bUshWai/J3IaGzONQ9sZUxybVW8u/uf1 MoxuglyoNEOu2HJRlEmCCZl/ToZCc4Z yagllWthbCRtTTRnafCo2BG/15XXSvmx 4bsO7v6o160UcZTiDc6iDB9fQhDtogQ 8MBDzDK7w5ynlx3p2PZWvJKWZO4Q+czx /Ik46S</latexit><latexit sha1_ba se64="gGptupImd/7iYtmAQiLHsVgH1a k=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh6 9LBahp5KIoMeCF48VTFtoQ9lsN+3SzSb sTsQS+hu8eFDEqz/Im//GbZuDtj4YeLw 3w8y8MJXCoOt+O6WNza3tnfJuZW//4P CoenzSNkmmGfdZIhPdDanhUijuo0DJu6 nmNA4l74ST27nfeeTaiEQ94DTlQUxHS kSCUbSSnz8NvNmgWnMb7gJknXgFqUGB1 qD61R8mLIu5QiapMT3PTTHIqUbBJJ9V+ pnhKWUTOuI9SxWNuQnyxbEzcmGVIYkS bUshWai/J3IaGzONQ9sZUxybVW8u/uf1 MoxuglyoNEOu2HJRlEmCCZl/ToZCc4Z yagllWthbCRtTTRnafCo2BG/15XXSvmx 4bsO7v6o160UcZTiDc6iDB9fQhDtogQ 8MBDzDK7w5ynlx3p2PZWvJKWZO4Q+czx /Ik46S</latexit><latexit sha1_ba se64="gGptupImd/7iYtmAQiLHsVgH1a k=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh6 9LBahp5KIoMeCF48VTFtoQ9lsN+3SzSb sTsQS+hu8eFDEqz/Im//GbZuDtj4YeLw 3w8y8MJXCoOt+O6WNza3tnfJuZW//4P CoenzSNkmmGfdZIhPdDanhUijuo0DJu6 nmNA4l74ST27nfeeTaiEQ94DTlQUxHS kSCUbSSnz8NvNmgWnMb7gJknXgFqUGB1 qD61R8mLIu5QiapMT3PTTHIqUbBJJ9V+ pnhKWUTOuI9SxWNuQnyxbEzcmGVIYkS bUshWai/J3IaGzONQ9sZUxybVW8u/uf1 MoxuglyoNEOu2HJRlEmCCZl/ToZCc4Z yagllWthbCRtTTRnafCo2BG/15XXSvmx 4bsO7v6o160UcZTiDc6iDB9fQhDtogQ 8MBDzDK7w5ynlx3p2PZWvJKWZO4Q+czx /Ik46S</latexit><latexit sha1_ba se64="gGptupImd/7iYtmAQiLHsVgH1a k=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh6 9LBahp5KIoMeCF48VTFtoQ9lsN+3SzSb sTsQS+hu8eFDEqz/Im//GbZuDtj4YeLw 3w8y8MJXCoOt+O6WNza3tnfJuZW//4P CoenzSNkmmGfdZIhPdDanhUijuo0DJu6 nmNA4l74ST27nfeeTaiEQ94DTlQUxHS kSCUbSSnz8NvNmgWnMb7gJknXgFqUGB1 qD61R8mLIu5QiapMT3PTTHIqUbBJJ9V+ pnhKWUTOuI9SxWNuQnyxbEzcmGVIYkS bUshWai/J3IaGzONQ9sZUxybVW8u/uf1 MoxuglyoNEOu2HJRlEmCCZl/ToZCc4Z yagllWthbCRtTTRnafCo2BG/15XXSvmx 4bsO7v6o160UcZTiDc6iDB9fQhDtogQ 8MBDzDK7w5ynlx3p2PZWvJKWZO4Q+czx /Ik46S</latexit> x5
<latexit sha1_base64="eULKmgkTIf +NRaHMINAHYHWPl1M=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aOXxSL0VBJR9Fjw4rG CaQttKJvtpl262YTdiVhCf4MXD4p49Qd589+4bXPQ1gcDj/dmmJkXplIYdN1vZ2 19Y3Nru7RT3t3bPzisHB23TJJpxn2WyER3Qmq4FIr7KFDyTqo5jUPJ2+H4dua3H7 k2IlEPOEl5ENOhEpFgFK3k50/9q2m/UnXr7hxklXgFqUKBZr/y1RskLIu5QiapM V3PTTHIqUbBJJ+We5nhKWVjOuRdSxWNuQny+bFTcm6VAYkSbUshmau/J3IaGzOJ Q9sZUxyZZW8m/ud1M4xuglyoNEOu2GJRlEmCCZl9TgZCc4ZyYgllWthbCRtRTRn afMo2BG/55VXSuqh7bt27v6w2akUcJTiFM6iBB9fQgDtogg8MBDzDK7w5ynlx3p 2PReuaU8ycwB84nz/Op46W</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="eULKmgkTIf +NRaHMINAHYHWPl1M=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aOXxSL0VBJR9Fjw4rG CaQttKJvtpl262YTdiVhCf4MXD4p49Qd589+4bXPQ1gcDj/dmmJkXplIYdN1vZ2 19Y3Nru7RT3t3bPzisHB23TJJpxn2WyER3Qmq4FIr7KFDyTqo5jUPJ2+H4dua3H7 k2IlEPOEl5ENOhEpFgFK3k50/9q2m/UnXr7hxklXgFqUKBZr/y1RskLIu5QiapM V3PTTHIqUbBJJ+We5nhKWVjOuRdSxWNuQny+bFTcm6VAYkSbUshmau/J3IaGzOJ Q9sZUxyZZW8m/ud1M4xuglyoNEOu2GJRlEmCCZl9TgZCc4ZyYgllWthbCRtRTRn afMo2BG/55VXSuqh7bt27v6w2akUcJTiFM6iBB9fQgDtogg8MBDzDK7w5ynlx3p 2PReuaU8ycwB84nz/Op46W</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="eULKmgkTIf +NRaHMINAHYHWPl1M=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aOXxSL0VBJR9Fjw4rG CaQttKJvtpl262YTdiVhCf4MXD4p49Qd589+4bXPQ1gcDj/dmmJkXplIYdN1vZ2 19Y3Nru7RT3t3bPzisHB23TJJpxn2WyER3Qmq4FIr7KFDyTqo5jUPJ2+H4dua3H7 k2IlEPOEl5ENOhEpFgFK3k50/9q2m/UnXr7hxklXgFqUKBZr/y1RskLIu5QiapM V3PTTHIqUbBJJ+We5nhKWVjOuRdSxWNuQny+bFTcm6VAYkSbUshmau/J3IaGzOJ Q9sZUxyZZW8m/ud1M4xuglyoNEOu2GJRlEmCCZl9TgZCc4ZyYgllWthbCRtRTRn afMo2BG/55VXSuqh7bt27v6w2akUcJTiFM6iBB9fQgDtogg8MBDzDK7w5ynlx3p 2PReuaU8ycwB84nz/Op46W</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="eULKmgkTIf +NRaHMINAHYHWPl1M=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aOXxSL0VBJR9Fjw4rG CaQttKJvtpl262YTdiVhCf4MXD4p49Qd589+4bXPQ1gcDj/dmmJkXplIYdN1vZ2 19Y3Nru7RT3t3bPzisHB23TJJpxn2WyER3Qmq4FIr7KFDyTqo5jUPJ2+H4dua3H7 k2IlEPOEl5ENOhEpFgFK3k50/9q2m/UnXr7hxklXgFqUKBZr/y1RskLIu5QiapM V3PTTHIqUbBJJ+We5nhKWVjOuRdSxWNuQny+bFTcm6VAYkSbUshmau/J3IaGzOJ Q9sZUxyZZW8m/ud1M4xuglyoNEOu2GJRlEmCCZl9TgZCc4ZyYgllWthbCRtRTRn afMo2BG/55VXSuqh7bt27v6w2akUcJTiFM6iBB9fQgDtogg8MBDzDK7w5ynlx3p 2PReuaU8ycwB84nz/Op46W</latexit>
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Figure 1: Illustration example of the LS1 function, with S = 1, 3, 6. The solid black curve connects
the data point x, the dashed red curve denotes the function ξS , and the red arrows denote
the distance between the points in x and the function ξS . The LS1 (D) value is the sum of
these distances.
Figure 1 provides an example with a graphical illustration of the LS1 function. The black solid curve
delineate x. The set S = (1, 3, 6) and the sampled points x1, x3, and x6 are colored red. ξS is the
piecewise linear function passing through the sampled points and is represented with dashed red
lines. The red arrows denote the distance between the points in x and their corresponding values in
ξS and the LS1 -score for the set S is the sum of these distances. The procedure assumes that the first
and the last points of x are in S.
Intuitively, the set of k points that minimizes (4) produce the minimal reconstruction error
when linear interpolation is used as a reconstruction procedure. However, finding the set of k points
minimizing the L1-scoring function may be computationally expensive. Hence this paper presents a
differentially-private greedy algorithm that approximates (4). The sampling procedure is depicted in
Algorithm 3 and is an instantiation of the SVT mechanism where the queries compute the L1-scores
of the potential interpolation steps.
The mechanism takes, as inputs, the data stream x processed for the current w-period, the
number of points k to sample for measurements, along with the privacy budget s and a user defined
threshold θ ≥ 0 which influences the acceptableL1-score for choosing the next point to sample. The
values choice for θ in our application of interest are detailed in Section 6. Line (1) initializes the set
of sample points S with the first element of the w-period (this choice is necessary for executing the
interpolation in the next steps), and it tracks the last point tp selected for sampling. The algorithm
first generates the noise ρ (line 2) for the threshold θ (line 5). For all but the first time step, the
algorithm adds Laplace noise with parameter 4k∆L/ to the L
[tp,i]
1 -query (line 4), where ∆L is the
largest sensitivity associated with any of the L1 scoring functions invoked by the algorithm (see
Theorem 6). If the result is above the threshold, then point i is added to S (line 6) and the last
selected point tp is updated (line 7). The mechanism keeps track of the number of index points
already stored. It stops when the size of S matches k (line 10). The mechanism also tests if there
are enough points to reach k (line 8) and adds the remaining points if needed (line 9).
To run the mechanism, it is necessary to determine the sensitivity ∆[a,b]L1 of the L1-score defined
in (3), i.e.,
∆
[a,b]
L1
= max
D∼wD′
∣∣∣L[a,b]1 (D′)− L[a,b]1 (D)∣∣∣
where D and D′ are two w-neighboring data streams in a w-period.
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Algorithm 3: SAMPLE - Adaptive AUC-based sampler
input : x: the data stream seen in the current w-period
k: the number of samples
s: the privacy budget
θ: a threshold
output: S: A sample set of k points in [w]
1 S = {1}; tp = 1
2 ρ = Lap(2∆L/s)
3 for i = 2 . . . , w do
4 µi = Lap(4k∆L/s)
5 if L[tp,i]1 (x) + µi ≥ θ + ρ then
6 S = S ∪ {i}
7 tp = i
8 if w − i ≤ k − |S| then
9 S = S ∪ {j | i < i ≤ w}
10 Break if |S| = k
11 return S
The following theorem shows that ∆[a,b]L1 can be bounded, yielding a procedure to privately
sample k points in the w-period using an efficient, suboptimal, version of Equation (4).
Theorem6 For an arbitrary w-period and fixed indexes a, b ∈ [w] with a < b, the sensitivity ∆[a,b]L1
of the L[a,b]1 score is bounded by 2(b− a).
Proof. Consider two data stream w-periods D and D′ such that D ∼w D′ and focus, without
loss of generality, on their associated stream counts x and x′. Let ξ and ξ′ be shorthands for ξ[a,b]
and ξ′[a,b]. The goal is to bound∣∣∣L[a,b]1 (D′)− L[a,b]1 (D)∣∣∣ = b∑
i=1
∣∣|ξ′(i)− x′i| − |ξ(i)− xi|∣∣ ,
and each term of the summation can be bounded independently. If i = a∨ i = b, then ξ′(i) = x′i and
ξ(i) = xi, since x′i and xi are interpolated exactly and
∣∣|ξ′(i)− x′i| − |ξ(i)− xi|∣∣ = 0. Otherwise,
note that |x′i−xi| ≤ 1 sinceDi ∼ D′i = 1 for all i ∈ [w] by definition ofw-event privacy. Moreover,
since the pairs (ξ(a), ξ′(a)) and (ξ(b), ξ′(b)) differ by at most 1, it follows that |ξ′(i) − ξ(i)| ≤ 1
for every point i ∈ [a, b]. There are four cases to consider.
(1) If ξ′(i) ≥ x′i and ξ(i) ≥ xi, then∣∣|ξ′(i)− x′i| − |ξ(i)− xi|∣∣ = ∣∣(ξ′(i)− x′i)− (ξ(i)− xi)∣∣
=
∣∣(ξ′(i)− ξ(i))− (x′i − xi)∣∣
≤ 2.
(2) The case ξ′(i) < x′i and ξ(i) < xi is symmetric. (3) The case ξ
′(i) ≥ x′i and ξ(i) < xi requires
a further case analysis.
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(i) If ξ′(i) ≤ ξ(i), we have x′i ≤ ξ′(i) ≤ ξ(i) < xi. Since |xi − x′i| ≤ 1, it follows that
|ξ′(i)− x′i| ≤ 1 and |ξ(i)− xi| ≤ 1. Therefore∣∣|ξ′(i)− x′i| − |ξ(i)− xi|∣∣ ≤ 1.
(ii) If ξ′(i) > ξ(i), then ξ(i) + 1 ≥ ξ′(i) > ξ(i), since |ξ(i)− ξ′(i)| ≤ 1. It follows that
x′i ≤ ξ′(i) ≤ ξ(i) + 1 < xi + 1.
Since |xi − x′i| ≤ 1 and |ξ(i)− ξ′(i)| ≤ 1, |ξ′(i)− x′i| ≤ 1 and |ξ(i)− xi| ≤ 1 and therefore∣∣|ξ′(i)− x′i| − |ξ(i)− xi|∣∣ ≤ 1.
(4) Finally, the last case, ξ′(i) < x′i and ξ(i) ≥ xi, is symmetric to previous one. Therefore
∆
[a,b]
L1
= max
x∼wx′
|L[a,b]1 (D′)− L[a,b]1 (D)| ≤ 2(b− a).

Let S = (ι1, . . . , ιk) be a sequence of k indexes in [w]. Because of the stopping criteria, the
largest contiguous interval [ιi, ιj ] for i, j ∈ [k] has size w − k. The sensitivity of the L1-score on
such an interval is bounded by 2(w − k). Algorithm 3 thus uses
∆L = 2(w − k).
Theorem7 Algorithm 3 is s-differential private.
Proof. The proof is a direct consequence of the correctness of the SVT mechanism (Hardt &
Rothblum, 2010), Theorem 6, and the definition of ∆L. 
3.2 The Perturbation Procedure
Given the set S of k sampling indexes for a w-period, the perturbation process takes as input the
k-ary vector of the data stream measurements x[S] and outputs a noisy version x˜S of such vector
satisfying p-differential privacy. The process simply applies the Laplace mechanism with parame-
ter k∆A/p, where ∆A is the sensitivity of the aggregation query.
Theorem8 PERTURB satisfy p-differential privacy.
The above result follows by straightforward application of the Laplace mechanism (Theorem 4) on
a set of k points and parallel composition (Theorem 2).
3.3 The Reconstruction Procedure
The RECONSTRUCT procedure takes as input the noisy measurements x˜S ∈ Rk at the sample points
S in x and outputs a vector x˜ ∈ Rw of private estimates for the sub-stream x. Each value x˜i of x˜ is
obtained evaluating the function ξS at i. Section 4 analyzes how well the polynomial approximates
the data stream at any point xi. The reconstruction procedure is not required to query the real data
stream and uses exclusively private information to compute its output. Hence, the output x˜ remains
s + p-differential private by post-processing immunity of differential privacy (Theorem 3).
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Algorithm 4: POSTPROCESS – Optimization-based post-processing
input : x˜: the private data stream seen in the current w-period
QF(D); the set of feature queries
o: the privacy budget
output: xˆ: a private post-processed data stream
1 c =MLap(x;QFi , /(p− 1))
2 x∗ = argminx˙‖x˙− c˜‖22,λ =
p∑
i=1
1
mi
mi∑
j=1
(x˙ij − c˜ij)2 (O1)
subject to :
∀i′, i : Fi′ ≺ Fi, j ∈ [mi] : x˙ij =
∑
l:di′l⊆dij
x˙i′l (O2)
∀i, j : x˙ij ≥ 0. (O3)
return xˆ = x˙11, . . . , x˙1w
3.4 The Optimization-based Post-Processing
The noise introduced in the previous steps may substantially alter the values of the elements in the
w-period, so that some global properties of interest, such as the total sum of elements in the w-period
may differ from its original value. The goal of the post-processing step is to redistribute the noise
introduced by the previous steps using noisy information on aggregated values of the w-period. It
does so by casting the noise redistribution as an optimization problem whose solution guarantees
the consistency of different estimates of identical quantities.
The POST-PROCESS step computes the final estimates xˆ of the w-period data x using the pri-
vate data x˜ and additional queries over x. The procedure is summarized in Algorithm 4. It uses the
concept of features to capture semantic properties of the application of interest and queries these
features in addition to using the noisy input x˜ of the original data stream. For example, two im-
portant features in the analysis of WiFi connections profiles are those periods when peaks typically
occur, as well as the total amount of connections occurring in an w-period.
Formally, a feature is a partition of the w-period and the size of the feature is the number of
elements in the partition. We say that a feature F′ is a sub-feature of F, denoted by F′ ≺ F, if F′ is
obtained by sub-partitioning F. The feature query QF(D) on data streamD associated with feature
F = {d1, . . . ,dm} returns an m-dimensional vector (c1, . . . , cm) where each ci is the sum of the
values xj of x for j ∈ di.
Example3 Consider a w-period x = (10, 15, 20, 23, 41, 72, 55, 50, 88, 72, 40, 18) of size 12 re-
porting the number of WiFi connections to an access point in a day-period. Consider a fea-
ture F1 = {1, . . . , 12} that includes the indexes for all the elements of the w-period. The as-
sociated feature query QF1(D) = (10, 15, 20, 23, 41, 72, 55, 50, 88, 72, 40, 18) returns each fre-
quency value observed during the day. Next, we consider a sub-feature F2 of F1, defined
as F2 = {{1, 2, 3, 4}, {5, 6, 7, 8, 9}, {10, 11, 12}}. Its associated feature query QF2(D) =
(68, 306, 130) describes the sums of all connection frequencies associated with time steps in
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{1, 2, 3, 4}, {5, 6, 7, 8, 9}, and {10, 11, 12}, representing morning, afternoon, and evening hours
respectively.
The optimization-based post-processing takes as input the noisy data stream xˆ from the recon-
struction procedure and a collection of features queries QF(D) for each F in the set of features
F = {F1, . . . ,Fp}. For notational simplicity, we assume that the first feature always partitions the
data stream w-period into singletons, i.e., F1 = {{i} : i ∈ [w]}. The noisy answer to this query
is the output x˜ of the perturbation procedure (line (8) of Algorithm 2). When viewed as queries,
the inputs to the mechanism can be represented as a set of values QFi(D) = ci = (ci1, . . . , cimi)
(1 ≤ i ≤ p) or, more concisely, as c = (c11, . . . , cpmp). Finally, we assume that the partial ordering
≺ of features is given.
This first step of Algorithm 4 (line 1) applies the Laplace mechanism with privacy parameter

p−1 to each feature query (excluding the first one whose answer x˜ is already private), i.e.,
MLap(x;QFi , /p− 1) = c˜i = (c˜i1, . . . , c˜imi) (2 ≤ i ≤ p).
The resulting values c˜ = (c˜11, . . . , c˜pmp) are then post-processed by the optimization algorithm
depicted in line (2) to obtain the values x∗ = (x∗11, . . . , x∗pmp). Finally, the mechanism outputs a
data stream xˆ = (x˙∗11, . . . , x˙∗1w).
The essence of Algorithm 4 is the optimization model depicted in line (2). Its decision variables
are the post-processed values x˙ = (x˙11, . . . , x˙pmp), and λ = (λ1, . . . , λp) ∈ (0, 1]p is a vector
of reals representing weights for the terms of the objective function. The objective minimizes the
squared weighted L2-Norm of x˙− c˜, where the weight λi of element xij − c˜ij is 1mi .
The optimization is subject to a set of consistency constraints among comparable features and
non-negativity constraints on the variables. For each pair of features (Fi′ ,Fi) with Fi′ ≺ Fi,
constraint O2 selects an element dij ∈ Fi and all its subsets di′l ∈ Fi′ and imposes the constraint
x˙ij =
∑
l:di′l⊆dij
x˙i′l,
which ensures that the post-processed value x˙ij is consistent with the sum of the post-processed
values of its partition in Fi′ . By definition of sub-features, there exists a set of elements in Fi′
whose union is equal to dij .
Theorem9 The optimization-based post-process achieves o-differential privacy.
Proof. Since each feature partitions the w-period over the data stream, each feature query is a
count query with sensitivity 1. Thus, each c˜ij (i > 1) obtained from the Laplace mechanism is o-
differential-private by Theorem 4 and the values x˜ = c˜11, . . . , c˜1w are differential private (Theorems
7 and 8). Additionally, (c˜11, . . . , c˜pmp) is o-differential-private by Theorem 1. Finally, the result
follows from post-processing immunity (Theorem 3). 
Observe that the mechanisms considered in this paper all operate over the universe of the data
stream in the w-period. This is the case for instance of the Laplace mechanisms which runs in
polynomial time in the size of the w-period. The next theoretical result characterizes the complexity
of the optimization model depicted in line (2) and hence the complexity of Algorithm 4. Recall that
a δ-solution to an optimization problem is a solution whose objective value is within distance δ of
the optimum.
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Theorem10 A δ-solution to the optimization to the optimization model in line (2) (Algorithm 4)
can be obtained in time polynomial in w, the number of features, and 1δ .
Proof. First observe that the number of variables and constraints in the optimization model are
bounded by a polynomial in size of the period w and the number of features p. Indeed, since the
features are partitions, every set di′l in Constraint (O2) is a subset of exactly one dij . The result
then follows from the fact that the optimization model is convex, which implies that a δ-solution can
be found in time polynomial in the size of the universe, the number of features, and 1δ (Nemirovski,
2004). 
4. Error analysis
This section analyzes how the sampling and reconstruction procedure can improve the accuracy
of the output. It characterizes the error E‖xˆ − x‖22 of the results of Algorithm 2 over a w-period
stream release, when the equally-spaced approach is selected as a sampling procedure and no post-
processing is applied (i.e., when the algorithm releases x˜ (line 8, Algorithm 2)).
4.1 Sample and Reconstruct
Consider a w-period of the data stream x using the same notational assumptions introduced in the
previous period, and thus we focus in a w-period in [1, w]. Let k = |S| be the number of samples
selected for measurements, by the equally-spaced sampling in addition to the initial point. This
determines the length of each segment m = w/k during which the RECONSTRUCT procedure
interpolates values without extra measurements. We assume m to be an even integer. Let L be the
Lipschitz constant defined as L := supt∈[w] xt − xt−1.
Theorem11 The error introduced by Algorithm 2 (ignoring post-processing) with the equally-
spaced sampling procedure with parameter k is bounded by O
(
m2L2w + 2w
2L
 +
w3
m22
)
.
Proof. For notational simplicity, consider the first interval I = {1, . . . ,m} of the w-period,
where the sample points 1 and m are selected. Thus, x1 and xm are measured privately. The
reconstruct procedure uses linear interpolation between x1 and xm to recover the values of the
non-sampling points x2, . . . , xm−1.
For each point i ∈ [m], there are two sources of error: the perturbation error ep and the recon-
struction error er. The worst-case reconstruction error is bounded by er = mL. The perturbation
error ep is the additive Laplace noise. There are k measurements taken, and hence the privacy bud-
get  must be divided by k, which results in ep = |x˜i − xi| = Lap(k/). This error adds to the
perturbation error at every point in the w-period. Therefore, for all i ∈ [m], the expected error is:
E‖x˜i − xi‖22 ≤ E
[
(er + ep)
2
]
≤ EZ∼Lap(k/)
[
(mL+ Z)2
]
= m2L2 + 2mL
k

+ (
k

)2.
Multiplying this quantity by the number m of points in the interval gives
E‖x˜[I]− x[I]‖22 ≤ mE‖x˜i − xi‖22 ≤ m3L2 + 2m2L
k

+m(
k

)2.
15
F. FIORETTO & P. VAN HENTENRYCK
As a result, the error ‖x˜[I]− x[I]‖22 is bounded by O(m3L2 + 2m2Lk +m(k )2). Multiplying the
above by the number of intervals wm in the w-period gives the final error which is bounded by
O
(
m2L2w + 2
w2L

+
w3
m22
)
.

For m =
√
w
L , the above expression generates an error of O(w
2L/).2 In comparison, apply-
ing the Laplace mechanism to produce a private sub-stream in the w-period produces an error of
wELap(w/)[Z2] = w
3
2
.
The result above shows that choosing a sampling parameter k to sample uniformly every m
time steps may allow Algorithm 2 to produce outputs with a substantially lower error than those
obtained by the Laplace mechanism. Although this result applies to the equally-spaced sampling
procedure, Section 6 demonstrates experimentally that the L1-sampling procedure outperforms its
equally-spaced counterpart.
4.2 Optimization-based Post-Processing
The following result is from (Fioretto, Lee, & Van Hentenryck, 2018). It bounds the error of the
optimization-based post-processing. It proves that the post-processing step can accommodate any
side-constraints without degrading the accuracy of the mechanism significantly.
Theorem12 The optimal solution to the optimization model in line (9) of Algorithm 2 satisfies
‖x∗ − x‖2,λ ≤ 2‖x˜− x‖2,λ.
Proof. It follows that:
‖x∗ − x‖2,λ ≤ ‖x∗ − x˜‖2,λ + ‖x˜− x‖2,λ
≤ 2‖x− x˜‖2,λ.
where the first inequality follows from the triangle inequality on weighted L2-norms and the second
inequality follows from
‖x∗ − x˜‖2,λ ≤ ‖x− x˜‖2,λ
by optimality of x∗ and the fact that x is a feasible solution to constraints (O2) and (O3). 
5. Privacy Model Extensions
This section first presents an extension of the privacy model that protects disclosure of arbitrary
quantities within the w-event privacy model. It then generalizes the theoretical results of OPT-
STREAM to this extended privacy model. Finally, it describes an extension of OPTSTREAM that
supports hierarchical data streams.
2. Here, to simplify notation, we consider m as a real value.
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5.1 α-Indistinguishability for Data Streams
The application studied in this paper requires the private release of energy load consumption
streams. Unlike the previous setting, where the participation of users is revealed at each time step,
the new privacy setting requires the load consumption of each customer to be revealed for each time
steps. To capture this requirement, the data stream setting presented in Section 2.2 is extended to an
infinite sequence of elements in the data universe U = I × R× T , where I and T are defined as
in Section 2.2, and R is the set of possible events (i.e., the data items generated by users). In other
words, each tuple (i, r, t) describes an event that occurred at time t in which user i reported value r.
Each user transmits an aggregate summary of the stream periodically (e.g., every 30 minutes)
and the discrete time step k represents an aggregate (e.g., the sum or the average) of all values
describing the event occurring in time period k. This setting implies that a tuple (i, r, t) describes the
aggregate behavior of user i during the time period t. Here, a numerical count query Q : D → R|I|
returns an |I|-dimensional vector corresponding to the aggregated reports of each user in I. The
following example illustrates such behavior.
Example4 Consider a data stream system that collects power consumption data from customers
of an electric company distributed on a wide geographical region. Customers may correspond to
facilities (such as homes, hospitals, industrial buildings) or electrical substations, transmitting their
power consumption at regular intervals (e.g., every 30 minutes). The value rt ∈ R transmitted by
a customer at time t is a real number denoting the average amount of power (in MegaWatts) the
customer required during time interval t. The table below represents a the scenario in which user
customer1 consumes 3.1 MW at time t = 1, 3.2 MW at time t = 2, and 2.8 MW at time t = 3.
I Q(D1) Q(D2) Q(D3) . . .
customer1 3.1 3.2 2.8
customer2 1.0 1.5 1.6
customer2 0.7 1.1 1.2
Customer identities are assumed to be a public information, as every facility consumes power.
However, their load fluctuations are considered to be highly sensitive. Indeed. changes in power
consumption may indirectly reveal production levels and hence strategic investments, decreases in
sales, and other similar information. These changes should not be revealed within some application-
specific period of w time steps. Thus, within each w-period, the privacy goal of the data curator is
to protect observed increases or decreases of power consumptions. More precisely, consider rtu and
r′tu be two distinct values that may be reported by user u at time t and that satisfy |rtu− r′tu| ≤ α for
some positive real value α. An attacker should not be able to confidently determine that u reported
value rtu instead of value r
′t
u and vice-versa.
This goal can be achieved by using a more general adjacency relation between datasets. This re-
lation needs to capture the distance between reported quantities whose magnitudes must be protected
up to some given value α > 0. The value α is called the indistinguishability level. This generalized
definition of differential privacy has been adopted in several applications and has sound theoretical
foundations (e.g., (Koufogiannis, Han, & Pappas, 2015; Andre´s et al., 2013; Chatzikokolakis et al.,
2013)3). Consider a dataset X to which n individuals contribute their real-valued data ri ∈ R, i.e.,
3. We refer the interested reader to (Chatzikokolakis et al., 2013) for a broad analysis of indistinguishability when
differential privacy uses different notions of distance.
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X = (r1, . . . , rn) ∈ Rn. For α > 0, an adjacency relation that captures the indistinguishability of
a single individual to the aggregating scheme is:
X ∼α X ′ ⇔ ∃i s.t. |ri − r′i| ≤ α and rj = r′j , ∀j 6= i. (5)
Such adjacency definition, in our target domain, is useful to hide increases or decreases of loads up
to some quantity α. The generalization of differential privacy that uses the above adjacency relation
is referred to as α-indistinguishability (Chatzikokolakis et al., 2013).
The w-privacy definition, introduced in Definition 2, can be extended to use α-
indistinguishability by replacing the standard neighboring relation between datasets with the ad-
jacency relation defined in Equation (5). More precisely, for a given α > 0, two data streams
prefixes D[t], D′[t] are said (w,α)-neighbors, written D[t] ∼αw D′[t], if (i) for each Di, D′i with
i ∈ [t], Di ∼α D′i, and (ii) for each Di, D′i, Dj , D′j , with i < j ∈ [t] and Di 6= D′i, Dj 6= D′j , it
must be the case that j − i+ 1 ≤ w holds.
Definition3 ((w,α)-indistinguishability) Let A be a randomized algorithm that takes as in-
put a stream prefix D[t] of arbitrary size and outputs an element from a set of possible out-
put sequences O. A satisfies w-event -differential privacy under α-indistinguishability ((w,α)-
indistinguishability for short) if, for all sets O ⊆ O, all (w,α)-neighboring stream prefixes
D[t], D′[t], and all t:
Pr[A(D[t]) ∈ O]
Pr[A(D′[t]) ∈ O] ≤ exp(). (6)
This privacy definition combines w-event privacy (Kellaris et al., 2014) and a metric-based gener-
alization of differential privacy (Chatzikokolakis et al., 2013) in order to meet the requirements of
the motivating application. Notice that (w,α)-indistinguishability is a generalization of w-privacy,
and it reduces to w-privacy when α = 1.
OPTSTREAM can be naturally extended to satisfy this definition, by calibrating the noise intro-
duced by the Laplace mechanism, used during the sampling (Theorem 6), perturbation (Theorem
8), and post-processing (Theorem 9) steps, to satisfy the above definition. More practically, it is
achieved by updating the definition of query sensitivity as:
∆Q = max
D[t]∼αwD′[t]
‖Q(D[t])−Q(D′[t])‖1.
Thus, in the (w,α)-indistinguishability model, the sensitivity of each query Q used during the per-
turb (see Section 3.2) and the post-process (see Section 3.4) procedures is ∆Q = α, and the sen-
sitivity ∆L of of the queries adopted in the L1-based reconstruction procedure (see Section 3.3)
is ∆L = 2α(w − k) . The behavior of OPTSTREAM for different indistinguishability levels is
presented in Section 6.
5.2 Hierarchical Data Streams
OPTSTREAM can also be generalized to support hierarchical data streams. A data stream D is
called hierarchical if, for any time t, there is an aggregation entry a = (ia, ra, t) associated with an
aggregation set Sa ⊆ I that reports the sum of values reported by all entries in Sa at time t, i.e.,
ra =
∑
u∈Sa r
t
u. More formally, a data stream is hierarchical if, for any two aggregation entries
a1, a2, either Sa1 ⊂ Sa2 or Sa2 ⊂ Sa1 holds or Sa1 ∩ Sa2 = ∅ is true.
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A set of aggregation entries S can be represented hierarchically through a tree (called an aggre-
gation tree) in which the root is defined by the entry that is not contained in any other entries and
the children of an aggregation entry p are all the entries in D whose identifiers are contained in Sp.
The height of a hierarchical data is the maximum path length from the root to any leaf of its tree.
Example5 In our target application, a data curator is interested in the aggregated load consump-
tion stream at the level of a small geographical region, at a group of regions within the same elec-
trical sub-station, and finally at the nation-level. These aggregations form a hierarchy whose root is
represented by the nation-level aggregation entry, its children by the electrical sub-station entries,
and the tree leaves by the region-level entries.
To answer each query of the hierarchical stream, OPTSTREAM is extended as follows. For each w-
period, the algorithm runs the sampling, perturbation, and reconstruction procedure for each level of
the aggregation tree representing the hierarchical stream. Finally, the post-processing optimization
takes as input the answers to all the aggregation entries queries with the set of features being equal
to the set of aggregation entries. The post-processing step thus enforces consistency between the
aggregation counts at a node and the sum of counts at its children nodes in the tree, in addition to
the features described earlier in the paper.
Theorem13 For a hierarchy of height h, OPTSTREAM, when using a privacy budget of /h for
each level of the hierarchy, satisfies -differential privacy.
The result follows from the privacy guarantee of OPTSTREAM (Theorem 1), parallel composition
of differential privacy across each level of the hierarchy (Theorem 2), and sequential composition
of differential privacy, for each of the h hierarchical queries (Theorem 1).
6. Evaluation
This section evaluates OPTSTREAM on real data streams for a number of tasks. It first evaluates
the accuracy of the private release of a stream of data within the w-privacy model. Then, it studies
the accuracy of each of the four individual components of the algorithm. Finally, it evaluates the
algorithm within the (w,α)-indistinguishability model.
Dataset The source data was obtained through a collaboration with Re´seau de Transport
d’E´lectricite´, the largest energy transmission system operator in Europe. It consists of a one-year
national-level load energy consumption data with a granularity of 30 minutes. The data is aggre-
gated at a regional level and R denotes the set of regions. Each data point in the stream represents
the total load consumption of the customers served within a region during a 30 minute time period.
Thus, for every region R ∈ R, a stream of data x(R) = x1(R), x2(R), . . . is generated where
xt(R) represents the energy demand to supply in order to serve the region R at time t. When the
streams of all regions are aggregated, the resulting load consumption data constitutes a data stream
of the energy profile at a national level.
For evaluation purposes, the experiments often consider a representative region (Auvergne -
Rhoˆne-Alpes) to analyze the data stream release. For the evaluation of hierarchical data streams,
the experiments consider a hierarchical aggregation tree of height 2, where the root node is the
national level and each of the leaves corresponds to one region. Table 2 lists an overview of the data
streams derived from the real energy load consumption data for each French region in 2016. Each
data stream contains 17,520 entires.
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Stream Data Regions (R) Daily Average (MW) Stream Data Regions (R) Daily Average (MW)
Auvergne-Rhoˆne-Alpes 7717.58 Ile de France (Paris) 8315.13
Bretagne 2554.23 Nouvelle Aquitaine 4985.68
Bourgogne - Franche-Comte` 2498.23 Normandie 3267.22
Centre - Val de Loire 2157.97 Occitanie 4314.7
Grand Est 5286.24 Pays de la Loire 3174.17
Hauts de France 5832.26 Provence - Cote d’Azur 4782.4
Table 2: Overview of the power load consumption stream data derived from the France regions in
2016. Daily Average refers to the average power (in MW) demanded daily. The number
of time steps available for all regions is 17,520.
Algorithms The following sections evaluate two versions of OPTSTREAM, with equally-spaced
sampling and with the L1-sampling. They are compared against the Laplace mechanism and the
Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) algorithm (Rastogi & Nath, 2010). All the algorithms release
private data associated with the sub-streams x for each w-period.
To ensure -differential privacy for eachw-period, the Laplace mechanism applies Laplace noise
with parameter /w to each value in the period. To ensure -differential privacy, the DFT algorithm
works as follows. For each w-period, and given a value k < w, it first computes the Fourier
coefficients DFT (x)j =
∑w
i=1 exp(
2pi
√−1
w jixi) of each sub-stream x and each j ∈ [w]. It then
considers the k coefficients of lowest frequencies – which represent the high-level trends in x – and
perturbs them using Laplace noise with parameter
√
k∆2Q/, where ∆2Q is the L2 sensitivity of
the count query. It then pads the vector of noisy coefficients with a (w − k)-dimensional vector
of 0’s to obtain a w-dimensional vector. Finally, it applies the Inverse Discrete Fourier Transform
(IDFT) to this w-dimensional vector to obtain a noisy estimate of the elements in the w−period. In
more details, if fˆj is the j-th perturbed coefficient of the series, the noisy estimate for the value xj
is obtained through the IDFT function as: 1w
∑w
i=1 exp(
2pi
√−1
w ji)fˆj .
6.1 Stream Data-Release in the w-Privacy Model
This section evaluates the accuracy of privately releasing a data stream within the w-privacy model.
It first studies the prediction error of the algorithms. It then analyzes the accuracy of privately
releasing hierarchical streams on aggregated queries. Finally, it analyzes the accuracy of forecasting
tasks from the released private data streams.
Answering queries over contiguous w-periods corresponds to releasing the private stream over
the entire available duration. Figure 2 illustrates the real and private versions of the data-stream for
the Auvergne-Rhoˆne-Alpes region in January, 2016. It uses w-periods of size 48 for given privacy
budgets  = 1.0, 0.1, and 0.01, shown in the top, middle, and bottom rows respectively. Recall that
the choice for the w-period allows the data curator to ensure the protection of the observed power
consumptions within each period. Thus, the released stream protects loads in each entire day.
The real loads are illustrated in the first column. The figure compares our proposed OPT-
STREAM algorithm (fourth column) against the Laplace mechanism (second column), and the DFT
algorithm (Rastogi & Nath, 2010) (third column).
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Figure 2: Real load consumption data for the Auvergne-Rhoˆne-Alpes region in January 2016 (first
column) and its private versions obtained using Laplace (second column), DFT (third
column), and OPTSTREAM (fourth column) with privacy budget  = 1 (top),  = 0.1
(middle), and  = 0.01 (bottom).
The experiments set the number of Fourier coefficients in the DFT and sampling steps in OPT-
STREAM to 10. The privacy budget allocated to perform each measurement is split equally. Ad-
ditionally, for OPTSTREAM s = p = o = 13, and the L1-sampling procedure uses a thresh-
old value θ of 1000 (which is about one tenth of the average load consumption in each region).
This information was publicly revealed. Finally, OPTSTREAM uses the following feature query set
F = {F1,F2,F3} in the optimization-based post processing step, with F1 ≺ F2 ≺ F3. F1 is de-
fined as described in Section 3.4; F2 partitions eachw-period in 4 sets, the intervals [0, 14), [14, 24),
[24, 36), and [36, 48) that correspond to aggregated consumption for the following times of the day:
[0am-7am), [7am-12pm), [12pm-6pm), and [6pm-0am) respectively. F3 partitions each w-period
in a single set, listing all the time steps within the w-period and thus describing the aggregated daily
energy consumption. The query set represents salient moments in the day associated with differ-
ent consumption patterns. These are proxy of consumer behaviors and thus energy consumption.
Because these queries return private answers, the privacy is guaranteed by the post-processing im-
munity of DP (see Theorem 3). Finally, if an algorithm reports negative noisy value for a stream
point, we truncate it to zero.
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Figure 3: L1-error analysis: Load stream data for the months of February (left), June (middle), and
October (right). The y-axis reports log10 of the average L1-error for all the stream data
streams R ∈ R.
Figure 2 clearly illustrates that, for a given privacy disclosure level, OPTSTREAM produces
private streams that are more accurate than its competitors when visualized. The next paragraph
quantifies the error reported by the algorithms.
6.1.1 AVERAGE L1-ERROR ANALYSIS
This section reports the average L1-error for each w-period produced by the algorithms. For each
input data stream xR associated to a region R ∈ R (illustrated in Table 2) and each reported private
stream xˆR, we compare the average L1-error defined as: 1NR ‖xˆR − xR‖1, where NR is the length
of the data stream associated with region R. Figure 3 reports the average errors across all streaming
regions r ∈ R for the months of February (left), June (middle), and October (right). The con-
sumptions in these three months capture different customers load profile behaviors due to different
weather patterns and durations of the day light. Each histogram reports the log10 value of the aver-
age error of 30 random trials. Two version of OPTSTREAM (OPTSTREAMES and OPTSTREAMLS)
are presented and correspond to the qqually-spaced sampling, and the L1-sampling procedures, re-
spectively. While all algorithms induce a notable L1-error which increases as the privacy budget
decreases, the figure highlights that OPTSTREAM consistently outperforms competitor algorithms.
Additionally, OPTSTREAM with L1-sampling is found to outperform its equally-spaced sampling
counterpart, especially for large privacy budgets. For small privacy budgets, the two versions of the
algorithm tend to perform similarly. This is due to the fact that the L1-score becomes less accurate
as the amount of noise increases.
6.1.2 HIERARCHICAL PRIVATE DATA-STREAM RELEASE
This section evaluates the extensions proposed in Section 5.2 for releasing aggregated queries over
hierarchical data streams. We answer the following queries over contiguousw-periods for the whole
duration of the stream: count queries over the data stream x(R) = x1(R), x2(R), . . . for each region
R ∈ R listed in Table 2, as well as count queries x = x1, x2, . . ., where each xt =
∑
R∈R xt(R)
represents the aggregated load consumption at national level. Thus, we create a hierarchy of two
levels and answer simultaneously all queries. We allocate a privacy budget of 2 to each level of
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Figure 4: L1-error analysis: Hierarchical energy load stream data for the months of February, June,
and October. The y-axis reports log10 of the average L1-error at national level (top) and
at the regional level (bottom).
the hierarchy. OPTSTREAM is compared against the Laplace mechanism applied to each stream
data, using a uniform allocation of the privacy budget ( 2 ) for each query in a different level of the
stream hierarchy and the DFT algorithm which answers queries over each data stream by uniformly
allocating a portion of the privacy budget at each level of the hierarchy.
Figure 4 shows the results for three different months of the year: February (left), June (mid-
dle), and October (right), and under different indistinguishability parameters α for privacy budget
 = 1.0. The top row of the figure reports the average L1-errors when releasing stream data x(R)
associated with each region R, while the bottom row gives the L1-errors when releasing the stream
data x at national level. Each histogram reports the log10 value of the average error of 30 random
trials. The results illustrates similar trends to those in previous experiments. Overall, OPTSTREAM
with the adaptive L1-sampling produces stream data with the lowest average L1-errors for both
levels of the stream hierarchy. In addition to the improved error it is important to note that OPT-
STREAM ensures the consistency of the values of the private stream in the hierarchy, i.e., for each
time step, the reported sum of the loads across all regions equals the reported load at national level.
Neither the Laplace mechanism nor DFT do ensure such property.
6.1.3 IMPACT OF PRIVACY ON FORECASTING DEMAND
The final results evaluate the capability of the released private streams to accurately predict future
consumptions. To do so, we adopt the Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) model (Alwan
& Roberts, 1988; Zhang, 2003; Cochrane, 2005; Hipel & McLeod, 1994). ARMA is a popular
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Figure 5: Prediction error: Forecast for a one day load consumption through an ARMA model on
the real load consumption data (Real) and its private versions obtained using Laplace,
DFT, and OPTSTREAM with privacy budget  = 0.1.
stochastic time series model used for predicting future points in a time series (forecast). It com-
bines an Autoregressive (AR) model (Alwan & Roberts, 1988) and a Moving Average (MA) model
(Alwan & Roberts, 1988; Cochrane, 2005), i.e., ARMA(p, q) combines AR(p) and MA(q) and
is suitable for univariate time series modeling. In an AR(p) model, the future value of a vari-
able xt is assumed to be a linear combination of the past p observations and a random error:
xt = c +
∑p
i=1 φixt−i + βt, where c is constant, βt is a random variable modeling white noise
at time t, and the φi(i = 1, . . . , p) are model parameters. A MA(q) model uses the past q errors in
the time series as the explanatory variables. It estimates a variable xt using µ+ βt +
∑q
i=1 θiβt−i,
where the θi(i = 1, . . . , q) are model parameters, µ is the expectation of xt, and the βt terms
are white noise error terms. The ARMA model with parameters p and q refers to the model with
p autoregressive terms and q moving-average terms: It estimates a future time step value xt as
c+βt+
∑p
i=1 φixt−i+
∑q
i=1 θiβt−i. In our experiments, we use an ARMA model with parameters
p = q = 1 to estimate the future 48 time steps (corresponding to a day) when trained with the
past four weeks of the private data stream estimated using Laplace, DFT, and OPTSTREAM with
L1-sampling. All models use the same parameters adopted in the previous sections.
Figure 5 visualizes the forecast for the load consumptions in the Auvergne-Rhoˆne-Alpes region
for February 2, 2016. The black and gray solid lines illustrates, respectively, the real load values
observed so far and those of the day to be forecasted. The dotted red lines illustrates the private
stream data estimated so far (and used as input to the prediction model) and the solid red lines depict
the prediction obtained using the ARMA model. Figure 5 shows the forecast results using the real
data (Real) and the private stream obtained through Laplace, DFT, and OPTSTREAM, respectively.
The figure clearly shows that OPTSTREAM is able to visually produce better estimates for the next
day forecast.
We also quantitatively evaluate the average L1-error for each prediction produced by the mech-
anisms. We adopt the same setting as above for the prediction and report, in Figure 6, the average
L1-error for predicting each day in the month of February, June, and October for the Auvergne-
Rhoˆne-Alpes region. Each histogram reports the log10 value of the average error of 30 random
trials. We observe that OPTSTREAM reports the smallest errors compared to all other privacy-
preserving algorithms, and that the error made by OPTSTREAM in reporting the next day forecast
is closer to the error made in the forecast prediction using the real data than when using another
method.
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Figure 6: L1 error analysis: ARMA forecasting model on stream data for the energy loads of the
months of February, June, and October for the Auvergne-Rhoˆne-Alpes region.
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Figure 8: Average L1 error for the ARMA forecasting model on stream data for the energy loads
of the months of February (left), June (middle), and October (right) for the Auvergne-
Rhoˆne-Alpes region.
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Figure 9: Real load consumption data for the Auvergne-Rhoˆne-Alpes region in January, 2016
(Real) and OPTSTREAM activating: exclusively the perturbation step (hP,  ,  i), per-
turbation and optimization steps (hP,  , Oi), perturbation and sampling steps (hP, S,  i),
and all steps (hP, S,Oi ). The top row, illustrates the results for privacy budget ✏ = 0.1,
while the bottom row uses ✏ = 0.01.
6.2 Evaluation of OPTSTREAM Individual Components
We also evaluate the effect of the different sampling strategies as well as the benefits of the post-
processing procedure of OPTSTREAM.
Figure 9 visualizes the real (first column) and OPTSTREAM-based private version (other
columns) load consumption data for the Auvergne-Rhoˆne-Alpes region in January, 2016. The top
row and bottom rows illustrate results for privacy budgets of ✏ = 0.1 and 0.01, respectively.
In order from the second to the last row, Figure 9 illustrates the results of a version of OPT-
STREAM that enables, exclusively the perturbation step (hP,  ,  i), the perturbation and the op-
timization steps (hP,  , Oi), the perturbation and the sampling steps (hP, S,  i), and all steps
(hP, S,Oi ). The privacy budget is divided equally among all active components of the algorithm.
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while the bottom row uses ✏ = 0.01.
6.2 Evaluation of OPTSTREAM Individual Components
We also evaluate the effect of the different sampling strategies as well as the benefits of the post-
processing procedure of OPTSTREAM.
Figure 9 visualizes the real (first column) and OPTSTREAM-based private version (other
columns) load consumption data for the Auvergne-Rhoˆne-Alpes region in January, 2016. The top
row and bottom rows illustrate results for privacy budgets of ✏ = 0.1 and 0.01, respectively.
In order from the second to the last row, Figure 9 illustrates the results of a version of OPT-
STREAM that enables, exclusively the perturbation step (hP,  ,  i), the perturbation and the op-
timization steps (hP,  , Oi), the perturbation and the sampling steps (hP, S,  i), a d all steps
(hP, S,Oi ). The privacy budget is divided equally among all active components of the algorithm.
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Figure 7: Real load consumption data f r the Auvergn -R oˆn -Alpes reg on in January, 2 16
(Real) and OPTSTREAM activating: exclusively the perturbation step (〈P, ◦, ◦〉), per-
turbation and optimization steps (〈P, ◦, O〉), perturbation and sampling steps (〈P, S, ◦〉),
and all steps (〈P, S,O〉 ). The top row, illustrates the results for privacy budget  = 0.1,
while the bottom row uses  = 0.01. The boxes in the last two quadrants provide a zoom
to illustrate in more d tails the reco structed time series.
6.2 Evaluation of OPTSTREAM Individual Components
We also evaluate the effect of the sampling step as well as the benefits of the post-processing pro-
cedu e of OPTSTREAM. Figure 7 visualizes the real (first column) and OPTSTREAM-based private
version (other columns) load consumption data for the Auvergne-Rhoˆne-Alpes region in January,
2 16. The top row and bottom rows illustrate results for privacy budgets of  = 0.1 and 0.01
respectively.
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Figure 8: OptStream components analysis: Average L1-error associated with the energy loads of
the months of February, June, and October.
In order from the second to the last row, Figure 7 illustrates the results of a version of OPT-
STREAM that enables only the perturbation step (〈P, ◦, ◦〉), the perturbation and the optimization
steps (〈P, ◦, O〉), the perturbation and the sampling steps (〈P, S, ◦〉), and all steps (〈P, S,O〉). The
privacy budget is divided equally among all active components of the algorithm. When only the
perturbation step is enabled (second column), OPTSTREAM has the same behavior of the Laplace
mechanism. The addition of the optimization step (third column) helps increasing the fidelity of
the data stream reported (for instance, the heavy peaks are less pronounced), although the overall
signal is still noisy. When the perturbation step is combined with the sampling step under the L1
reconstruction procedure (fourth column), the resulting private stream captures with much higher
fidelity the salient load peaks and the streams looks much more similar to the real one. However,
a careful inspection reveals several shortcomings: Several load peaks are not captured accurately,
and the loads are often distributed uniformly between sampled points, making the resulting stream
unrealistic. Finally, the optimization-based post-processing shines when integrated with the pertur-
bation and sampling steps (5-th column). The salient features of the data are effectively captured
and the noise redistribution provides higher resemblance to the real data stream.
Figure 8 details the L1-errors associated with the private energy loads for the months of Febru-
ary, June, and October. This quantitative analysis further highlights the importance of the four
components of the proposed OPTSTREAM algorithm. It illustrates a gradual error reduction of the
framework when it adopts, in order, the perturbation step only, the perturbations and the optimiza-
tion steps, the perturbation and the sampling with linear interpolation steps, and finally, all four
steps.
6.3 Stream Data-Release in the (w,α)-Indistinguishability Model
Having analyzed the algorithms in the w-privacy setting, this section illustrates the results of the
private data streams released under the combined w-event and α-indistinguishability models (see
Section 5.1). The motivating application requires releasing the private data streams without disclos-
ing chosen amounts of load changes within a time window. We thus analyze the results of privately
releasing a stream of data under the (w,α)-indistinguishability model and use an adapted version
of OPTSTREAM, the Laplace mechanism, and the DFT algorithm. These versions recalibrate the
26
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noise required by the mechanisms to satisfy the (w,α)-indistinguishability definition as detailed in
Section 5.1.
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Figure 9: Real load consumption data for the Auvergne-Rhoˆne-Alpes region in January 2016, and
its private versions obtained using Laplace, DFT, and OPTSTREAM with privacy budget
 = 1 and α = 10 (top), 50 (middle), and 100 (bottom).
Figure 9 illustrates the real and private versions of the data stream for w-periods of size 48
(i.e., one day) given privacy budget of  = 1 and indistinguishability parameter α = 10 (top row),
α = 50 (middle row) and α = 100 (bottom row). Recall that the choice of the indistinguishability
parameter α allows the data curator to ensure the protection of the observed increase/decrease power
consumption up to α MegaWatts (MW), while the w-period specifies the length of the obfuscation
period. The figure compares our proposed OPTSTREAM algorithm against the Laplace mechanism
and DFT .
For DFT and OPTSTREAM, the experiments set the number of Fourier coefficients and sampling
steps to 10 (when α ≤ 50) and 5 (when α = 100). As in the previous experiments, the privacy bud-
get allocated to perform each measurement is divided equally. Finally, OPTSTREAM uses the same
feature query setF used in the previous experiments. Figure 9 clearly illustrates that OPTSTREAM
produces private streams that are more accurate than its competitors when visualized. This is es-
pecially evident for high indistinguishability parameters, when the Laplace mechanism can barely
preserve any signal from the original data.
We now report the L1-errors averaged for each w-period produced by the algorithms. Figure 10
reports the average results for each streaming region for the months of February, June, and October,
at varying of the indistinguishability parameter α = {10, 50, 100} given a privacy budget  = 1.0.
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Figure 10: L1-error analysis: Energy load stream data for the months of February, June, and Octo-
ber. The y-axis reports log10 errors averaged across the L1 errors for each stream data
R ∈ R.
Each histogram reports the log10 value of the average error of 30 random trials. While all algorithms
induce an L1-error which increases as the indistinguishability level α increases, the figure highlights
that OPTSTREAM consistently outperforms the other algorithms.
7. Discussion
One of the core advantages of the w-privacy model is that it provides flexibility regarding the size of
the time frame to protect. OPTSTREAM exploits this flexibility to select a small set of representative
points to sample and performs additional optimization over such values to redistribute noise and
enhance accuracy. Practically, this means that the data stream needs to be batched in periods of w
times steps, each of which is privately released at once.
Recall that the privacy model adopted in this paper combines the w-privacy model (Kellaris
et al., 2014) with the definition of α-indistinguishability (Chatzikokolakis et al., 2013). The re-
sulting (w,α)-indistinguishability model allow us to protect events related to quantities which are
not directly related to user identities but can be used a proxy to disclose a secret (e.g., a sensitive
information) about a user. For instance, in our application domain, it is important to both protect
the given stream from inferences about load increases or decreases–which are typically related to
sensitive user activities–while also protecting the stream in an entire day.
While settingw = 1 would allow to use OPTSTREAM to release the stream data online – without
requiring batching –, this setting offers no room for OPTSTREAM to improve accuracy, since it
would be similar to the Laplace mechanism. To the best of our knowledge, the only available
algorithm that can release a private data stream online is PeGaSus (Chen et al., 2017). It uses a
combination of the Laplace mechanism, a partitioning strategy to group values in contiguous time
steps whose deviation is small, and a smoothing function. PeGaSus, was not introduced in the
w-event model as it focuses on protecting data in a single time-step.
Despite the fact that the two algorithms were designed for solving different problems, we
adapted PeGaSus to the w-privacy model and to satisfy the (w,α)-indistinguishability and com-
pare it against OPTSTREAM for completeness. Figure 11 illustrates a comparison of the algorithms
on privately releasing load streams for the Auvergne-Rhoˆne-Alpes region in January 2016. The real
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Figure 11: Real load consumption data for the Auvergne-Rhoˆne-Alpes region in January 2016
(left), and its private versions obtained using PeGaSus (center), and OPTSTREAM (right)
with privacy budget  = 1 (top-row),  = 0.1 (middle-row), and  = 0.01 (bottom-row).
loads are highlighted in the first column, while their private counterparts are shown in the second
and third columns. The figure compares our proposed OPTSTREAM (third column) against PeGa-
Sus (second column) for indistinguishability parameters α = 10 (top rows) α = 50 (middle row)
and α = 100 (bottom row), and fixed a privacy budget  = 1. For PeGaSus, the privacy budget
is divided equally for each time step in the w-period. Additionally, the experiments use the values
of the meta-parameters indicated in the original paper (Chen et al., 2017). The settings for OPT-
STREAM are the same as in the previous sections. Figure 11 clearly illustrates that OPTSTREAM
produces private streams that are more accurate than those produced by PeGaSus, when the (w,α)-
indistinguishability model is adopted. It is an interesting research avenue to combine PeGaSus and
OPTSTREAM.
8. Related Work
Continuous release of aggregated real-time data has been studied in previous work including
(Dwork, 2010; Dwork et al., 2010). Most of the state-of-the-art either focuses on event-level pri-
vacy on infinite streams (Rastogi & Nath, 2010) or on user-level privacy on finite streams (Dwork
et al., 2010). Dwork proposed an adaptation of differential privacy to a continuous observation set-
ting (Dwork et al., 2010). Her work focused on releasing bit-streams and proposed an algorithm
for counting the number of 1s in the stream under event-level differential privacy. Mir, Muthukr-
ishnan, Nikolov, and Wright (2011) proposed pan-privacy for estimating counts, moments, and
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heavy-hitters on data streams while preserving differential privacy even if the internal memory of
the algorithms is observed by an attacker. Kellaris et al. (2014) proposed the notion of w-event
privacy to balance event-level and user-level privacy, trading off utility and privacy to protect event
sequences within a time window of w time steps. OPTSTREAM applies to the last model.
Within the differential privacy proposal for data streams that fit such model, Wang, Zhang, Lu,
Wang, Qin, and Ren (2016) proposed Rescue DP, which is designed explicitly for spatiotemporal
traces. PeGaSus (Chen et al., 2017) is another seminal work that allows to protect event privacy
using a combination of perturbation, partitioning, and smoothing. The algorithm uses a combina-
tion of Laplace noise to perturb the data stream for privacy, a grouping strategy which incrementally
partitions the space of observed data points by grouping points with small deviations, and a smooth-
ing schema which is used to post-process the private data stream. Both algorithms rely on the idea
of contiguous grouping time steps and average the perturbed data within every region in a group.
We compared OPTSTREAM against PeGaSus, which is the state-of-the-art on private data-stream
release and has been showed to be effective in several settings.
Rastogi and Nath (2010) proposed an algorithm which perturbs a small number of Discrete
Fourier Transform (DFT) coefficients of the entire time series and reconstructs a released version of
the Inverse DFT series. While, in the original paper, the algorithm requires the entire time-series,
such approach has been used for w-event privacy in the context of data streams (Fan & Xiong,
2014). We also compare OPTSTREAM against DFT.
Fan, Xiong, and Sunderam (2013) proposed Fast, an adaptive algorithm for private release of
aggregate statistics which uses a combination of sampling and filtering. Their algorithm is based
on user-level differential privacy, which is not comparable to the chosen model of w-event level
differential privacy. Additionally, in their work, the authors compare the proposed approach against
DFT (Rastogi & Nath, 2010) and, while showing improvements, the error remains within the same
error magnitude of those produced by DFT. In contrast, our experimental analysis (Section 6) clearly
illustrates that OPTSTREAM reduces the error of one order of magnitude when compared to DFT.
Finally, Chan et al. (2011) focused on releasing prefix-sums of the streaming data counts while
adopting an event-based privacy model. Bolot et al. (2013) also used an event-based model and
proposed an algorithm for answering sliding window queries on data streams. The model adopted
in their work is however incompatible with the privacy model adopted in this work, and hence we
did not compare against such approaches.
9. Conclusions
This paper presented OPTSTREAM, a novel algorithm for privately releasing stream data in the
w-event privacy model. OPTSTREAM is a 4-step procedure consisting of sampling, perturbation,
reconstruction, and post-processing modules. The sampling module selects a small set of data points
to measure privately in each period of interest. The perturbation module injects noise to the sampled
data points to ensure privacy. The reconstruction module reconstructs the data points excluded from
measurement from the perturbed sampled points. Finally, the post-processing module uses convex
optimization over the private output of the previous modules, along with the private answers of
additional queries on the data stream, to ensure consistency of quantities associated with salient
features of the data. OPTSTREAM was evaluated on a real dataset from the largest transmission
operator in Europe. Experimental results on multiple test cases show that OPTSTREAM improves
the accuracy of the state-of-the-art by at least one order of magnitude in this application domain. The
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accuracy improvements are measured, not only in terms of the error distance to the original stream
but also in the accuracy of a popular load forecasting algorithm trained on private data sub-streams.
The results additionally show that OPTSTREAM exhibits similar benefits on hierarchical stream
data which is also highly desirable in practice. Finally, the experimental analysis has demonstrated
that both the adaptive sampling and post-processing optimization are critical in obtaining strong
accuracy. Future work will be devoted to generalizing these results to the streaming setting where a
data element is emitted at each time step.
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